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Recent international declarations stress the importance of 
partnerships between and amongst donors, the state and civil 
society, in order to improve service delivery and promote qualities of 
good governance, particularly in key sectors such as education. 
However, in conditions of state fragility—where high levels of 
distrust between and amongst these ‘partners’ may exist; large and 
often ungovernable flows of assistance are common; and the 
capacity of state institutions is weak or non-existent—the feasibility 
of such partnerships must be critically examined. This paper 
examines these dilemmas within the context of Timor-Leste’s basic 
education sector, with specific attention paid to how external actors, 
internal service providers and the Ministry of Education have 
‘partnered’ to qualify more than 8,000 teachers through in-service 
training. The author suggests that donors are increasingly compelled 
to work within a framework, which presents both practical 
challenges and deeper ideological conundrums. Ultimately, the 
interests of teachers and children are being left behind in the drive 
for alignment, coordination and harmonisation.  
[Keywords: fragile states, partnership, education, Timor-Leste, 
foreign aid] 
Introduction 
The tango—the sensual, rhythmic, graceful, and elegant dance from Argentina—
is the product of a leader and follower inextricably related and actively connected 
to each other, moving in tandem, as they glide across the dance floor. The 
expression, ―it takes two to tango‖ comes from an understanding of the dynamics 
of such a relationship, specifically the need for both partners to be willing and 
engaged actors in the dance, and more importantly dancing in the same direction. 
For Timor-Leste (East Timor), a still nascent and evolving nation straddled 
between the Pacific and Southeast Asian regions, the role of the international 
community has been critical in the development and evolution of the state 
apparatus built following its independence in 1999. Immediately following 
independence, the United Nations Transitional Administration for East Timor 
(UNTAET), under Security Council Resolution 1272, was given authority for 
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administering the territory, establishing vital state institutions, and restoring basic 
services. However, since 2002, the role of multilateral and bilateral partners has 
shifted from one of substituting for the state, to building internal capacity so the 
state might then deliver services to its citizens effectively and efficiently. In this 
transition, and set against the backdrop of new frameworks for aid effectiveness, 
the international community is increasingly following rather than leading the 
state towards stability and long-term development. 
The start of the 21
st
 century saw a proliferation of accords, agreements and 
declarations that have intended to reshape the ways in which donors and 
recipients work amongst and between each other (OECD, 2008, p.7). 
Partnerships under such agreements have focused on the need for donors and the 
state to ensure more efficient and effective service delivery, while simultaneously 
ensuring that activities are state driven and based on broad consensus of ‗what 
works‘ for that particular context. Initially, states labelled as fragile1, were 
excluded from such compacts due to concerns around governance, the 
incoherence between short-term humanitarian and longer-term reconstruction 
responses, and gaps of trust in how such financing would be utilised or managed 
(Brannelly, Ndaruhutse & Rigaud, 2009).  
By the end of the decade, recognition that many of these nations were the ones 
furthest from achieving MDG targets, prompted consideration of how to include 
fragile states within these partnership frameworks and the funding that is aligned 
with them (Leo & Barmeier, 2010). The OECD-DAC Principles for Good 
International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations (2007) and Dili 
Declaration (2010) both stress that donors should: ―do no harm‖; take context as 
a starting point; align with local priorities in different contexts in different ways; 
coordinate activity with each other and with the state; and focus on state building 
as much as possible. 
There are a number of concerns regarding the feasibility and practicality of 
partnership arrangements between donors and recipients in such environments, 
however. Important concerns exist regarding whose interests such arrangements 
serve, and whose voices are excluded from them (Brinkerhoff, 2002; Roberston 
et al., 2007). If the ―consensus‖ reached on specific development goals and 
activities lacks public legitimacy, or fails to recognise the actual capacity or will 
of the state and its partners to achieve these goals, credibility can falter. Thus 
writers such as Pavanello and Othieno (2008) have suggested that prior to 
considering partnerships, it must be ascertained if the competing goals and 
expectations of three distinct groups—namely the state, service providers and 
citizens—are best managed through coordinated and harmonised action. 
Concerns arise when the rhetoric of ‗partnership‘ overshadows another important 
role for donors in fragile state environments—that of ensuring effective service 
                                                     
1 In line with evolving thinking on the labelling of nation-states as fragile states (see for example 
Davies, 2009, p.11), this paper considers fragility as typified by: deficits in governance, an inability 
to maintain security, an inability to meet essential needs of citizens, polarisation of identities, high 
aid dependency, a lack of transparency in decision-making; and perhaps most critically, a lack of 
will and/or capacity on the part of the state. 
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delivery. An overemphasis on working through and within state institutions may 
further exacerbate the divide between a political elite and their constituents, 
without effecting improvements in service delivery. Specific to the education 
sector, the failure of such efforts to lead to perceived improvements in the quality 
and relevance of schooling can serve as a potential trigger for future conflict or 
unrest (Smith & Vaux, 2003; Tawil & Harley, 2004; Rose & Greeley, 2006; 
Davies, 2010) 
The argument advanced in this paper is that given the important need for these 
partnership arrangements to ―do no harm‖ in fragile state environments, greater 
consideration may need to be taken about when, why, how and whether to enter 
into such arrangements. It follows in the critique advanced by Coxon and Tolley 
(2005) that false consensus through the language of ‗partnership‘, on what aid 
should be directed towards within the education sector, and how these funds 
should be used, may do more harm than good. Such mechanisms can stifle 
critique of existing modes of service delivery promoted by donors and/or the 
state, effectively shutting down dialogue and discussion about viable alternatives 
and, worse, marginalising important contributions to policy and practice (Coxon 
& Munce, 2008).  
This paper explores the dynamics of such cooperation in Timor-Leste‘s education 
sector, with specific attention paid to how the state, donors and service providers 
have evolved in their partnership arrangements to provide in-service training to 
the large percentage of the country‘s primary school teachers deemed under or 
unqualified. It begins by providing a historical overview on how such training 
provision has evolved in the country, from independence in 1999 to the present. 
As part of this discussion, it highlights how in-service teacher training has shifted 
from project-based donor activity, to more coordinated and Ministry-driven 
processes. Subsequent sections then explore what implications the imperative for 
greater partnership between the state and donors have had on service provision, 
and the communication and dialogue processes that should inform joint activity. 
The objective of this paper is to highlight the tensions involved in moving 
towards coordinated activity in fragile states, particularly from the donor 
perspective. It does not aim to make a definitive statement on the new partnership 
agenda being promoted at a global level, but rather to explore the complexities 
involved in such arrangements in fragile states through a case study approach.  
Research Approach 
The data presented in this paper is extracted from the author‘s ongoing doctoral 
study into reforms to teaching and learning in Timor-Leste, and the impact these 
changes have had on the perceptions and practices of primary teachers 
throughout the country. For this paper, relevant data from documentary evidence 
and interviews with teachers, head teachers, and key stakeholders within the 
donor community and Ministry of Education (Ministry or MoE) are presented. 
The majority of data were collected during doctoral field research conducted over 
five months between February and July 2010, supplemented with findings from a 
separate evaluation project conducted by the author in October 2010.  
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Documentary evidence collected and analysed included official and publicly 
available donor documentation, as well as Ministry policies and guidelines. This 
data helped to inform understanding of the evolving importance and purpose of 
in-service teaching training in relation to quality-based educational imperatives 
in Timor-Leste, as well as the fashion in which such activity has occurred either 
within or outside of Ministry auspices (McMillan, 1992). Additionally, 
evaluation and research reports conducted by external consultants on behalf of 
the Ministry or particular donors was considered; some of this being ―grey 
literature‖ made available through key informants in Timor-Leste. All texts were 
actively scrutinised to gauge the discourses promoted, and stated and unstated 
intentions of action, serving to provide corroborating evidence for the arguments 
advanced in this paper (vanDijk, 1993).  
Interviews were conducted with nine key stakeholders, all holding senior 
positions within their respective donor agencies and/or with direct responsibility 
for developing and/or monitoring activities related to in-service teacher training. 
Additionally, six national-level Ministry officials, with responsibility or oversight 
for in-service training provision were interviewed. A total of nine school 
directors, interviewed individually, and thirty-nine primary school teachers, 
interviewed in groups, were also spoken to as part of the broader research 
project. Discussion focussed on a variety of themes related to teachers‘ beliefs 
about their practice and the reform efforts occurring within the country. For the 
purposes of this paper, topics relevant to the issue at hand, namely in-service 
teacher training and the relationships between donors and the government, were 
closely examined. Analysis occurred through a grounded approach, where coding 
was done iteratively, inductively, and towards increasing levels of abstraction to 
develop major themes and issues relayed in this text (Charmaz, 2005; Corbin & 
Strauss, 2008). All interviews were conducted in confidence, and individuals 
interviewed were given the choice on whether to be identified by their 
organisational affiliation. Thus names, positions and, in some instances, 
organisational affiliations are not utilised when referencing quotes from these 
individuals in the text that follows.  
Context 
Building the nation 
The turmoil and emigration that followed the Timorese vote for independence in 
1999 left the new nation‘s schooling system woefully understaffed. Data from 
this period suggest that approximately 20 per cent of primary teachers, and 80 per 
cent of secondary teachers permanently left the teaching profession (UNESCO, 
2008, p.122). A major challenge in the early years of reconstruction became 
recruiting and introducing a new teacher workforce into the system. Immediately 
following the cessation of conflict, the UN attempted to resume schooling by 
supporting ‗volunteers‘ who were paid a small salary and given bags of rice to 
fill the void in each community. Beginning in 2000, successive attempts to fill 
vacancies through a merit-based process failed to yield the desired numbers of 
teachers. As a result, standards were relaxed in terms of who could enter and/or 
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remain in the profession, and the majority of teachers who eventually were 
employed were deemed under or unqualified for the positions they assumed in 
schools.  
In the initial years following independence, large-scale opportunities for such 
training were ad hoc and not available to most teachers. The transition 
government had prioritised an emergency logic of intervention that treated 
teacher training as a second-tier priority (Nicolai, 2004). Between 2000-2004, 
Portugal was the most significant player in the realm of teacher training due to its 
―comparative language advantage‖ in meeting the demands of early governments 
to focus initial teacher training on the reintroduction of Portuguese into the 
classroom.
2
 Besides this attention on language, none of the other training needs 
of teachers were effectively considered in these initial years (Quinn, 2005; Beck, 
2008). 
A series of reports assessing the progress of Timor-Leste‘s educational system in 
2004-5 suggested that the ‗access first, quality later‘ approach taken by UNTAET 
and the Timorese government, as well as donors, had led to a number of longer-
term problems, in particular high student attrition rates, and poor student 
achievement (Millo & Barnett, 2004; Nicolai, 2004; World Bank, 2004; MEC, 
2005; Beck, 2008). The development and implementation of a new Timorese 
primary curriculum, which articulated in policy the new content, methodologies 
and languages of instruction to be used in schools, also increased pressure on the 
Ministry to support in-service training opportunities for teachers. An assessment 
of the workforce of the time suggested they were woefully unprepared for this 
new curriculum, stating, ―Few of the current stock of primary teachers have been 
properly trained and few have mastered more than simple classroom techniques 
and many have very limited subject knowledge‖ (MEC, 2005, p.12). Donors 
increasingly viewed in-service professional development as an imperative; to 
―improve the capacity of existing teachers‖ as ―their relative youth and apparent 
openness to change suggests that investment in in-service training would be 
worthwhile‖ (Davidson, 2005, p.16). It is also recognised, however, that the 
current context of Timor-Leste makes this a task easier said than done, for the 
following reasons: 
                                                     
2 With less than 20% of the population fluent in Portuguese at the time the Constitution 
reintroduced it an official language in 2000, Portugal and Brazil, through their respective aid 
programs, have made the reintroduction of Portuguese a key area of intervention. Early Portuguese 
activity placed teachers from Portugal inside schools to directly teach students the language. 
However, the challenge, according to one representative interviewed from Portugal‘s Cooperation 
Agency, was that, ―students had very little opportunity to actually learn the language well….in 
some schools [we tried] to teach Portuguese to the teachers during that time, but we had mainly 
teachers from Indonesian times, so they were very resistant to such classes‖. A longer-term 
programme for upskilling the qualifications and language competency of teachers was also 
initiated. However, the programme lacked adequate incentives to encourage teacher participation, 
and attrition rates were high, and the lack of assessment measures meant there was no way of 
tracking teacher progress (Lee, 2002). 
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1. Up to 75 per cent of the teaching workforce is deemed under or unqualified;3  
2. Schools remain widely dispersed geographically, and vary widely in terms of 
the expertise and skill internal to them;  
3. The current teacher workforce is perceived to lack motivation to participate 
in training; 
4. In the short to medium term, pre-service institutions do not have the capacity 
or size to produce sufficient number of new graduates to replace the current 
workforce; and 
5. Resources for such activities remain scare and difficult decisions must be 
made regarding the judicious allocation of Ministry budgets towards in-
service rather than pre-service activities (Davidson, 2005; Romiszowski, 
2005; MoE, 2009; World Bank, 2009; BELUN, 2010). 
A changing landscape for in-service training provision 
Within the Ministry of Education, the Instituto para Formação Continuada
4
 
(INFCP) has been the main service provider of in-service training since 2004. In 
its early years, however, INFCP was reported as being staffed mainly by foreign 
technical advisors, lacking appropriate infrastructure and resources, and without 
an appropriate mandate to develop activities autonomously (MEYCS, 2004, 
p.14). Thus, until 2008, in-service training provision was largely provided 
through donors such as Portugual, Brazil and UNICEF, alongside a number of 
smaller NGOs. Provision became plagued by fragmentation, duplication of 
efforts, poor coordination, poor systems of monitoring and accountability, 
leading to inefficient use of both teachers‘ time and the resources poured into 
such programmes, according to a number of donor reports (Davidson, 2005; 
Romiszowski, 2005; World Bank, 2009). The Ministry perception, according to 
one senior INFCP official, was that many training providers ―had their own 
agendas, lacked an understanding of the Timorese culture and had no respect for 
government processes and controls.‖ A lack of coordination between training 
providers also led to many actors feeling that they were ‗competing‘ for teacher 
participation and engagement in a crowded field. According to a representative 
from Portugal Cooperation, ―One day the teachers would be trained by Portugal, 
the next by another organisation like UNICEF and the next day with PROFEP, 
and the next with an NGO…there were just too many people sending different 
messages to these teachers.‖ These inefficiencies meant that training was often 
unevenly provisioned across the country, and insufficient to the needs of the 
workforce (Heyward, 2005; Quinn, 2008; MoE, 2009; Shah, 2012).  
Since 2008, however, there have been a number of significant changes to the 
fashion in which in-service training is regulated and provided for by the Ministry 
and its partners. The Organic Education Law of the Ministry of Education (2008) 
                                                     
3 The Education Act (2008) established the Bachelerato of Education, or an equivalent post-
secondary qualification in teaching, as the minimum standard for the teaching profession. A 2009 
World Bank report estimated that 75% of the current workforce did not meet this standard.  
4 Institute for Continuing Teacher Development 
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established the Direcção de Formação de Professores
5
 (DNFP). DNFP was 
given responsibility for coordinating all in-service training efforts within the 
country, and ensuring that all training that was offered was aligned to a 
comprehensive plan for the large percentage of teachers who are deemed 
un/underqualified to earn the appropriate credential.  
In its first year in operation, DNFP worked alongside these partners to pilot a 
new model for training. Using 250 trainers from Portugal Cooperation (IPAD), 
Brazil‘s teacher training programme (FROFEP), and INFCP, intensive training 
(cursos intensivos) was offered simultaneously to 8,000 un/underqualified 
teachers throughout the country in five regional centres during October and 
November 2008. Training focussed mainly on building the content knowledge of 
teachers, primarily in Portuguese language, but also in mathematics and 
geography/history. At the end of the training, all participants were asked to 
complete an assessment, which 90% of teachers passed, according to a senior 
Ministry official interviewed. Based on this initial success, these cursos 
intensivos have continued. Training has shifted to operate during three term 
holidays that occur during the school year (generally April, July and December) 
and has been further decentralised to occur concurrently in more than 50 sub-
district centres. The intent is that through these modularised programmes of in-
service provision, all teachers remaining within the workforce will gain a 
qualification by 2015, in a fashion that is flexible, efficient, and affordable. 
(World Bank, 2009; MoE, 2010b, p.141). 
At the same time, DNFP has worked to more tightly regulate, align and 
coordinate in-service providers towards achieving this goal. In 2008, it issued 
guidelines, which specify that training providers need to: (1) register with the 
Ministry of Education; (2) align all activities with the Teacher Competency 
Framework; and (3) provide a full programme proposal to the Directorate for 
discussion and approval. Additionally, it was required that any training occur out 
of normal school hours, or ensure that there were provisions for coverage in the 
case of teachers being pulled out of the classroom during instructional time 
(MoE, 2008).  
Working Within These New Arrangements of 
Partnership: Dilemmas and Paradoxes 
Set against the backdrop of the Paris Declaration for Aid Effectiveness, Accra 
Accord and the OECD-DAC Standards for Donor Engagement in Fragile States, 
donors are acutely aware of the need to align their activities with government 
objectives and ensure that ownership and leadership are located within the 
Ministry. The past five years has seen most donors move from an arrangement of 
shadow alignment, to one where most activity occurs by using and supporting 
existing Ministry systems and budgets. This has led to new challenges for 
development partners, particularly in learning to work within a system where 
political will continues to exceed the actual capacity for change.  
                                                     
5 Directorate for Teacher Training 
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Partnership arrangements have shifted the locus of power from donor driven 
agendas to Ministry articulated ones. However, donor pressure to deliver on such 
an agenda has meant that end users (namely teachers and students) have become 
more marginalised in their work. Some development partners are concerned that 
the agenda of partnership at the national level, and political pressures on the 
Ministry to show progress, have led to this outcome. As one donor remarked, the 
new partnership agenda has led to an overemphasis on ―on supporting national 
level activities‖, but ―infrequent attention to what is happening at the chalkface.‖ 
Donors attempting to address this imbalance often are ignored, or even chastised 
for operating outside of ‗agreed to‘ agendas. For some development partners this 
has required a choice between supporting the state apparatus in its drive to 
efficiently ‗qualify‘ all teachers; or target and tailor intervention to meet the 
actual needs of teachers. Each path entails its own opportunity costs. 
Learning to work with and within the Ministry  
The nature of Portugal‘s Cooperation Agreement with the Timorese government 
places it in a unique position, between that of donor and service provider 
(Cooperação Portugal, 2008, p.26). Its obligation is to follow, rather than lead 
Ministry decisions in regards to training. Through IPAD (Instituto Português de 
Apoio Desarrolho Cooperação Portugal), its support of teacher training 
programmes is classified under ―technical cooperation‖, and its mandate 
circumscribed as ―responding to the very concrete demands of the Timorese 
government‖ (Cooperação Portugal, 2008, p.51). The majority of its current 
effort in regards to in-service training focuses on supplying Portuguese teachers 
for the cursos intensivos. According to a representative from IPAD, this means 
that trainers, while hailing from Portugal and paid through Portuguese assistance, 
are effectively employees of the Institute.  
From a pragmatic perspective, this has placed IPAD between the donor and the 
state, in the awkward position of having to mediate demands and dissatisfaction 
from both sides. Concern exists about the feasibility of accomplishing the task of 
qualifying all teachers within Ministry timeframes. As an IPAD coordinator 
stated:  
I understand the Ministry‘s rationale for doing so because they have a 
political problem to deal with...they want to implement the Teacher Career 
Regime and to do so you need to quickly qualify all the teachers…but to do 
this you need to train the trainers well…[we] are not capable of training 
9,000 teachers this way. It is just not possible.  
Despite his perspective on the feasibility of such an endeavour, the nature of 
Portugal‘s ‗partnership‘ with Timor-Leste in this area (largely as a service 
provider) meant he was forced to go along with the Ministry‘s decisions. This 
was further complicated by the evolving nature of training provision from 2008 
to present. The same individual lamented that, ―in three years we have had three 
different models on how [intensive training] is offered‖. For IPAD this has 
serious implications in terms of being able to forecast and provide a sufficient 
number of trainers to meet last-minute demands. Often the organisation was 
asked to provide trainers less than a month prior to the commencement of each 
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curso intensivo, despite Ministry recognition that recruitment and training of new 
teachers was a lengthy process. Additionally, poor information flows between the 
DNFP, INFCP and IPAD meant that advance planning for training modules 
proved difficult, and limited the preparation that trainers could make in advance. 
One Ministry of Education official acknowledged that, ―because training gets 
done across the whole country at once, it doesn‘t get managed as well as it could 
be‖.  
For IPAD, in more than one instance, it failed in being able to provide the 
required numbers of trainers, thus compromising both service delivery and public 
faith in the government‘s capacity to meet promises.6 Similarly, Portuguese 
trainers spoken to in the field often expressed frustration with the lack of 
promised resources and materials from the Ministry, and felt they were often left 
to their own devices in terms of training content. Trainers had little direct 
communication with the local Ministry of Education office, and felt unsupported 
in their roles. IPAD and its trainers often came under criticism for the quality and 
organisation of training from teachers, as was witnessed at more than one 
location in April 2010. Agitated and frustrated teachers were observed directing 
anger at these trainers in personal attacks and acts of resistance (walking out of 
training, protesting in front of the classroom), with little external Ministry 
support in mediating these tensions.  
Other donors felt that partnership had become a ―give but not take‖ relationship, 
with donors expected to provide funds and assist in implementation but given no 
opportunity for assessment or dialogue once projects commenced. As an 
example, UNICEF‘s Eskola Foun programme7 is currently embedded within the 
INFCP. The agency funds and builds the capacity of INFCP trainers who then 
train teachers on implementing child-centred methodologies in schools. Despite 
outward Ministry recognition that the UNICEF approach had been successful in 
shifting teacher practice towards more child-friendly methods, key decision-
makers showed little interest in considering what made its initiative different in 
                                                     
6 While Ministry officials state that teachers should receive between 20-24 hours of face to-face 
instruction for each of the three weeks of training, the reality was that many teachers were 
receiving much less than this. During observations of this training in April 2010 at 13 different 
locations across the country, teachers received between four and ten hours of face-to-face support 
per week. The reason for this was largely due to an insufficient number of trainers available to 
conduct the training simultaneously in the 52 sites across the country. Trainers often needed to 
travel (sometimes great distances) between locations to reach teachers, cutting into effective 
delivery time. In interviews and conversations, teachers, particularly those who travelled great 
distances to attend training sessions, suggested that the limited hours that actually were offered 
made them question whether attendance was worth the effort. 
7 
This pilot program, operating in 39 schools is built around four main modules: helping teachers 
and students to establish and use active learning in their classroom; fostering linkages between the 
school and home; encouraging student and community participation through the establishment of 
student government; and helping teachers to use books based on the curriculum to promote 
integrated and practical learning. As part of each module, Institute trainers receive training in Dili, 
and then spend a week at each of their schools providing training and supporting teachers in 
implementing messages from each of the modules.  
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content and structure from the cursos intensivos.
8 
This proved difficult for 
UNICEF who felt that school-based programmes of training focussed on 
continuous monitoring and support were necessary if professional competencies 
of teaching methodology or professionalism were to be achieved. While UNICEF 
had been able to convince those within INFCP of this message, highly centralised 
and hierarchical decision-making processes precluded discussion of how this 
Eskola Foun programme fit into a broader Ministry plan for in-service teacher 
support. According to one UNICEF manager,  
We do work with the Ministry and they do get excited about what we are 
doing…but you know it is hard, because the national directors themselves 
do not take leadership and…advocate for us enough with the Minister and 
Vice-Minister. It shouldn‘t have to be UNICEF going in to defend what we 
do and our rationale for action…it should be the national directors…But 
yet, when we go into a meeting, we usually end up explaining what is 
occurring, and then it becomes us who is driving the agenda. 
The sentiment was that no space existed for engaging in discussion about 
changing the structure of the cursos intensivos or considering whether and why 
particular training efforts were effective. Rather the concern was that of 
expediency, and ensuring that the Ministry achieved its goal of qualifying all 
teachers by 2015. Thus continuous, school-based support remains on the fringes, 
rather than an integral part of in-service provision. 
Delivering on what is promised 
Mounting internal and external pressure to show results quickly has led to 
‗success‘ being judged by quantity served rather than quality of training 
delivered. National directors interviewed within the Ministry of Education often 
discussed the relative merits of various donors‘ professional development 
programmes by how many teachers they had trained. Thus, UNICEF‘s 
programme was seen as a ―success‖ according to one national director because 
―working with UNICEF, we have worked with nearly 4,000 primary school 
teachers on improving their practices, in only two years‖. Lacking, however, was 
a sense of whether and how the messages from training would be sustained in 
teacher practice. For one UNICEF representative, this was a frustration, stating 
that their ―goal is to get the Ministry to continue to follow up on the interventions 
we initiate...the trainers themselves are eager to do this…but the problem is that 
the system doesn‘t recognise the importance of that yet‖.  
While a number of development partners spoken to understood the political 
imperative of the Ministry providing in-service training en masse to all 
unqualified primary teachers through the cursos intensivos, many expressed 
concern that it would not lead to the necessary changes in outcomes that underlie 
such action. As a representative from one development partner questioned, 
                                                     
8 Reasons given in one report suggest that this is due to the Eskola Foun programme being school-
based in terms of the location of training, offering ongoing support/monitoring using the same 
group of trainers, and using Tetum for modules on professionalism or teaching methodology (MoE, 
2010a). 
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How do you teach twenty years worth of experience in five weeks, or two 
hours, or three weeks? It takes a lifetime to learn, so it is a little unfair to 
expect teachers to be everything. They are trying to promote ‗fast food 
development,‘ the motto being ‗if it is not delivered in 30 minutes then it 
should be free.‘ There is real danger in doing this with teacher professional 
development…there is not enough understanding [amongst the donors] that 
to become skilled takes time. 
Instruction in larger groups in sub-district centres for short period of times may 
be an efficient and cost-effective way of training en masse, but for many of the 
teachers interviewed their perception was that it wasn‘t always effective. One 
teacher argued that ―three weeks, three times a year is not enough…there is not 
enough training at the moment‖. Or put even more strongly by another head 
teacher, ―it is not enough to have teacher training for one or two weeks…instead 
it is better to offer something proper than to waste everyone‘s time‖.  
The focus on ―coverage‖ of training has tended to marginalise smaller NGOs, 
who may not have the same breadth as larger partners, but who were or are 
providing programmes of support that are more sustainable in the classroom. 
Thus, for Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), a smaller, but successful actor in 
the field of teacher training, a significant challenge in gaining Ministry 
ownership and/or acceptance of the programme they developed, was that they 
were small fish in a big pond (Shah & Leneman, 2010, p.19).  
Serving the needs of whom? 
In fragile state environments, donors must find the balance between supporting 
and building the state, and ensuring that development activities support ‗pro-
poor‘, or in this case ‗pro-student‘ outcomes (Pavanello & Othieno, 2008). 
Recognition of this trade-off led some actors to maintain autonomy and control 
over all aspects of project management, rather than to utilise Ministry staff and 
processes. One such case was NRC‘s Compact Teacher Training Programme 
(CTT), which operated as a one-year pilot programme in 2010. Implemented in 
30 remote schools, across two districts of Timor-Leste, the programme‘s intent 
was to offer a field-based and contextually driven programme of training on the 
teacher competency related to professionalism. In developing and implementing 
this pilot, NRC maintained control of all aspects of project management, rather 
than utilise Ministry processes for several reasons—including its need to operate 
within tight timeframes, maintain a methodology and approach to training that 
was at ‗odds‘ with Ministry philosophy (namely teaching in Tetum and working 
in a small number of schools), and employ and train its own cadre of Timorese 
trainers. However, the training programme aligned itself in both its form—by 
being context-based, flexible and recurrent as dictated by the Teacher Training 
Policy; and function—by developing a curriculum focussed on teachers 
demonstrating mastery of the domain of professionalism within the Competency 
Framework for Teachers. An evaluation of the programme found the programme 
to be successful in introducing child-friendly methodologies into the schools they 
worked in, gaining ownership and understanding from teachers over the value of 
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such techniques, and providing teachers with practical and contextually based 
activities they could immediately employ (Shah & Leneman, 2010).  
When school directors and teachers were interviewed regarding their current 
perceptions of training provision, many of them felt increasingly disillusioned 
with the quality and content of Ministry offerings. In addition to issues related to 
the brevity of the training on offer, many felt that locating the training in sub-
centres ignored the unique constraints faced within particular school locations. 
Lacking from the cursos intensivos but present in UNICEF‘s and NRC‘s 
programme of support were, ―practical suggestions, immediate feedback, and 
new methodologies and techniques that we can apply immediately in our 
classroom‖, according to one teacher spoken to. Another head teacher, cognisant 
of the needs of his teachers, felt that training needed to be a continuous process, 
such as that offered under the UNICEF model, rather than the modularised 
programmes offered through the cursos intensivos. He felt that, ―the best way to 
have a good quality teacher is to train them more individually rather than as a 
whole group. Building capacity is a process…teachers need time and individual 
practice‖. Finally, echoing the recommendation of UNICEF, strong support 
existed for training to occur in Tetum, rather than Portuguese. While teachers 
understood the importance of developing Portuguese competency, this created 
problems when the focus of training was centred around content or pedagogy 
rather than language. One teacher felt that, ―in order to learn in the training, you 
have to have a good understanding of Portuguese first. And this is a challenge for 
us …because we don‘t understand the language in the courses all the time‖. 
These interviews made it evident that NRC‘s experiment on how to reform in-
service support resonated strongly with those who ultimately are the beneficiaries 
of such activity. Despite this, NRC struggled to gain the cooperation or 
commitment from senior Ministry officials for building on their model, largely 
because it chose not to work within existing Ministry channels. As the final 
evaluation of the programme notes,  
Success [of the programme]…is due to the excellent management and 
timely execution of intended activities by NRC. Based on the experiences 
of donors who have handed over management of activity to the Ministry, or 
used existing Ministry systems, it is quite likely that [NRC‘s] degree of 
short-term success would have been more muted. However, NRC‘s 
challenge in getting higher level buy-in indicates that projects working 
independently of government systems for teacher training and project 
management may suffer in their long-term durability. (Shah & Leneman, 
2010, p.7)  
In recognition of this, several donors maintain that partnering with the Ministry 
in such activities is more important than achieving successful short-term 
outcomes, particularly if sustainability is desired. A World Bank representative 
interviewed suggested that, ―The international community should not be too 
heavily involved in training,‖ and that development partners should ―let the 
Timorese decide for themselves what they want‖. This viewpoint was reiterated 
by a senior UNICEF official who indicated that, ―ownership of our programme 
must rest with the government, rather than the donor, for it to be a sustainable 
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model that can then continue after donor support ceases‖. Much of this response 
was tied to the accountability these donors had to being good partners above all 
else. The opportunity cost within the current atmosphere of the Ministry is that 
donors are forced to accept, rather than challenge, processes and decisions 
regarding in-service training that contribute to poor outcomes and fail to 
acknowledge the needs of teachers and schools.  
Conclusion 
Recent years have seen donors shift their attention to working within and through 
the state apparatus, the result being that national mechanisms for service delivery 
have been strengthened with the Ministry now seen as taking a clear leadership 
role. This is an important step as the nation moves out of its reconstruction phase 
and into longer-term development objectives. Donor alignment, coordination and 
harmonisation with government priorities in the area of in-service teacher 
training has led to increased efficiency of provision, but this efficiency has come 
at a cost. Increased sensitivity to being seen as ‗willing partners‘, on the part of 
donors, has led to a situation where little scope exist to challenge, discuss or 
question the best possible way to support the current teacher workforce through a 
period of rapid transformation. Those that choose to stand and operate outside the 
Ministry, in the belief that service delivery is being sacrificed, have come to be 
seen as non-compliant or uncooperative actors, as was the case with NRC. 
The data from this study suggests that teachers (and students) have been 
effectively excluded from this partnership, despite the fact that they are (or 
should be) the key driver for joint action. Instead, what has been prioritised is 
political expediency, the drive for results, accountability to frameworks of good 
governance/partnership and efficiency. Lacking is a real sense of accountability 
to the teachers themselves, despite recognition on the part of the government that, 
―ownership comes with a responsibility to define our needs and be accountable 
for delivery.‖  
As previously stated, the OECD-DAC Principles (2007) state that the most 
important objective for donor engagement in fragile contexts should be that of 
―doing no harm.‖ The teachers and school directors spoken to as part of this 
study may not go so far as labelling current training provision as harmful, but 
there was broad consensus that current approaches were ineffective and in their 
eyes a waste of time. Resistance to current training provision has mounted over 
time, with teachers assembling to boycott and protest the poor quality of what is 
being offered by the Ministry with its development partners. Given that teachers 
are the largest group of public sector employees in the country, this discontent 
should be of concern to both donors and the state, and seen as a potentially 
harmful outcome of harmonisation, alignment and coordination that partnership 
discourses have created.  
84 Partnerships within the education sector in Timor-Leste 
References 
Beck, M. (2008) The context and history of the education sector in Timor-Leste. In J. 
Earnest (Ed.), Rebuilding Education and Health in a Post-Conflict Transitional 
Nation: Case Studies from Timor-Leste (pp.3-8). Rotterdam; Taipei: Sense Publishers. 
BELUN. (2010) Policy Brief: Access and Opportunity in Education. Dili: BELUN and 
CICR. 
Brannelly, L., Ndaruhutse, S., & Rigaud, C. (2009) Donors engagement: Supporting 
education in fragile and conflict-affected states. Paris and Reading, UK: International 
Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP) and CfBT Education Trust. 
Brinkerhoff, J. M. (2002) Partnership for International Development: Rhetoric or 
Results? Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. 
Charmaz, K. (2005) Grounded Theory in the 21st Century. In N. Denzin & Y. Lincoln 
(Eds.), The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research. Thousand Oaks CA: SAGE 
Publications. 
Cooperação Portugal [Portugal Cooperation]. (2008) Portugal: East Timor Indicative 
Cooperation Programme 2007-2010. Lisboa, Portugal: Instituto Português de Apoio 
Desarrolho Cooperação Portugal. 
Corbin, J., & Strauss, A. (2008) Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and 
Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory (3rd ed.). London: Sage Publications. 
Coxon, E., & Munce, K. (2008) The global education agenda and delivery of aid to 
Pacific education. Comparative Education, 44(2), 147-66. 
Coxon, E., & Tolley, H. (2005) Aid to Pacific Education: An Overview. In K. Sanga, H. 
Pārekereke & Victoria University of Wellington (Eds.), Re-thinking aid relationships 
in Pacific education. Wellington NZ; Suva: He Pārekereke, Institute for Research and 
Development in Māori and Pacific Education, Victoria University and Institute of 
Education, University of the South Pacific. 
Davidson, T. (2005) Background strategy paper for EFA mission, 6-11 June 2005. Dili: 
World Bank and UNESCO. 
Davies, L. (2009) Capacity development for Education System in Fragile Context. Centre 
for International Education and Research, University of Birmingham: in collaboration 
with ETF, GTZ, Sector Project Education and Conflict Transformation. 
Davies, L. (2010) The Different Faces of Education in Conflict. Development, 53(4), 
491-7. 
Heyward, M. (2005) Lafaek as a tool to support education improvements in East Timor. 
Dili: World Bank. 
Lee, K. W. (2002) Institutional arrangements for educational development in East Timor: 
East Timor Education Sector Study. Dili: World Bank. 
Leo, B., & Barmeier, J. (2010) Who are the MDG Trailblazers? A new MDG Progress 
Index. Washington DC: Centre for Global Development. 
McMillan, J. H. (1992) Historical and qualitative research. New York: Harper Collins. 
MEC [Ministry of Education and Culture]. (2005) Strategic Plan for Universal Primary 
Completion by 2015. Dili: Ministry of Education and Culture. 
Millo, Y., & Barnett, J. (2004) Educational development in East Timor. International 
Journal of Educational Development, 24(2004), 721-37. 
MoE [Ministry of Education]. (2008) Guidelines for teacher training programs offered 
during the school year. Dili: DNFP. 
MoE [Ministry of Education]. (2009) Draft National Teacher Training Policy 
Background and Framework Document Dili: Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, 
Ministry of Education. 
MoE [Ministry of Education]. (2010a) Final Report of Ministry of Education's "Eskola 
Foun" Program. Dili: INFCP and UNICEF. 
Shah 85 
MoE [Ministry of Education]. (2010b) National Draft Strategic Plan 2011-2030, 2nd 
Draft. Dili: Ministry of Education, Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. 
Nicolai, S. (2004) Learning independence: Education in emergency and transition in 
Timor-Leste since 1999. Paris: UNESCO. 
OECD. (2008) Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action. 
Retrieved November 12, 2010, from www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf 
OECD-DAC. (2007) Principles for good international engagement in fragile states and 
situations. Retrieved from www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/45/38368714.pdf 
Pavanello, S., & Othieno, T. (2008) Improving the provision of basic services for the 
poor in fragile environments. London: Overseas Development Institute. 
Quinn, M. (2005) Teachers' work in East Timor: some issues. Development Bulletin, 68, 
112-5. 
Quinn, M. (2008) Report on National Curriculum Project. UNICEF. 
Republica Democratica de Timor Leste. (2010). Dili Declaration: A new vision for 
peacebuilding and state building. Retrieved August 5, 2011, from timor-
leste.gov.tl/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/Dili_Declaration_FINAL_12.04.20101.pdf 
Roberston, S., Novelli, M., Dale, R., Tikly, L., Dachi, H., & Alphonce, N. (2007) 
Globalisation, Education and Development: Ideas, Actors and Dynamics, Available 
from webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/www.dfid.gov.uk/documents/publications 
/global-education-dev-68.pdf 
Romiszowski, A. (2005) Fundamental school quality project consultancy report on 
teacher professional development and school-based performance management: 
Context; current situation; future strategies. Dili: Democratic Republic of Timor-
Leste. 
Rose, P., & Greeley, M. (2006) Education in fragile states: Capturing lessons and 
identifying good practices. Sussex: Centre for International Development and Institute 
for Development Studies, University of Sussex. 
Shah, R. (2012) Goodbye conflict, hello development? Curriculum reform in Timor-
Leste. International Journal of Educational Development, 2012(32), 31-8. 
Shah, R., & Leneman, B. (2010) Moving Beyond the Temporary: An evaluation of the 
Norwegian Refugee Council's School Rehabilitation and Compact Teacher Training 
Program in Timor-Leste. Oslo: Norwegian Refugee Council. 
Smith, A., & Vaux, T. (2003) Education, conflict and international development. London: 
DFID. 
Tawil, S., & Harley, A. (Eds.). (2004) Education, Conflict and Social Cohesion. Geneva: 
International Bureau of Education, UNESCO. 
UNESCO. (2008) The State of Education in the Asia-Pacific Region. Bangkok: 
UNESCO. 
vanDijk, T. A. (1993) Principles of critical discourse analysis. Discourse & Society, 4(2), 
249-83. 
World Bank. (2004) Timor-Leste Education Since Independence from Reconstruction to 
Sustainable Improvement (Report No. 29784-TP): The World Bank. 
World Bank. (2009) Timor-Leste Fast Track Initiative Catalytic Fund Proposal. Dili: 
World Bank and Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. 
 
 
 
 
